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INSURANCE - 1955 TENNESSEE SURVEY
ROBERT W. STURDIVANT*
If a period of three years be sufficient time to detect any trend in
the field of insurance litigation, there is reflected a decrease in the
number of cases reaching our appellate courts having to do with
automobile liability insurance and an increase in the number of cases
having to do with health and accident policies-the latter probably
being the result of the extension of group insurance. In the past year
there were only two reported decisions in the state courts and one in
the federal court sitting in Tennessee involving automobile liability
policies. During the present Survey period, there have not been the
significant decisions of the past two years concerning the liability of
insurer to insured for loss resulting from the insurer's failure to settle
within the policy limits.'
I. LiABmiry INSURANCE
In English v. Virginia Surety Co.,2 decided by the Supreme Court,
the policy covered a truck tractor belonging to one Stevens, who was
the named insured. The policy contained the usual omnibus clause
defining the insured as including the named insured and, "except
where specifically stated to the contrary," any person while using the
automobile, "provided the actual use of the automobile is with the
permission of the named insured." An endorsement had been appended
to the policy which provided that coverage extended in accordance
with the terms and conditions of the policy, provided that "no load or
merchandise other than that belonging to, or in charge of, the named
assured is being carried, and only while such automobiles are being
operated in the business occupation of the named assured as stated
in item 1 of the policy declarations and occasionally for the personal,
pleasure, family and other business purposes of the named assured."
Stevens had loaned the vehicle to his brother in order for him to
take his family to a reunion. While being so operated by the brother,
the truck tractor was involved in a collision resulting in personal
injury and property damage to complainant English. English had
recovered a circuit court judgment against the brother, to collect
which he had filed the instant suit in the chancery court against the
* Lecturer in Law, Vanderbilt University; member, Trabue & Sturdivant,
Nashville, Tennessee.
1. The only development in this field was the affirmance by the federal court
of appeals in a per curiam opinion of an earlier case wherein liability so
predicated was imposed. Hartford Acc. & Indemnity Co. v. Vanderbilt Uni-
versity, 218 F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1954), affirming 109 F. Supp. 565 (M.D. Tenn.
1952).
2. 196 Tenn. 426, 268 S.W.2d 338 (1954).
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insurance company. A demurrer was interposed wherein it was urged
that the endorsement limits the omnibus clause and that since the
vehicle was not being used either for the commercial purposes of the
named assured or for an occasional personal, pleasure or family pur-
pose of the named insured, there was no coverage. The chancellor
sustained the demurrer but the Supreme Court reversed. There was
no question but that in the absence of the endorsement, the omnibus
clause extended coverage to the user of the truck.3 The court, noting
an omnibus clause that coverage extended to persons using the vehicle
with the permission of the named insured except where specifically
stated to the contrary, found no such contrary statement in the en-
dorsement. Further the policy declared that the vehicle was to be used
for "commercial" purposes; in the policy the term "commercial" was
defined as a use principally in the business occupation of the named
insured, including occasional use for personal, pleasure, family and
other business purposes. It was felt that at least one reasonable inter-
pretation of the endorsement was that it merely restated the definition
of commercial purposes appearing in the policy and was not a limita-
tion on the omnibus clause. The court noted the rule of construction
resolving ambiguities against the insurer and overruled the demurrer.
The other case of coverage decided by the Supreme Court was Blue
Ridge Ins. Co. v. Haun,4 a declaratory judgment suit filed by the in-
surance company in the chancery court. The insured at the time of
the accident was towing behind his automobile a "hot rod" racing car
which was owned by the insured and another. The towed vehicle was
not covered by any separate insurance policy. The hot rod had become
detached from the insured vehicle and had collided with an oncoming
car. The towing vehicle had not been involved. The insurance policy
excluded coverage "while the automobile is used for the towing of any
trailer owned or leased by the insured and not covered by like in-
surance in the company ... ." In the same paragraph of exclusions,
the policy provided (under the sub-head "Utility Trailers") for cover-
age while towing a trailer "if designed for use with a private passenger
automobile, if not being used with another type automobile and if not
a home, office, store, display or passenger trailer . .. ."
The chancellor and the Court of Appeals held that this hot rod auto-
mobile was not a trailer within the meaning of the policy and that ac-
cordingly coverage extended to the insured, but the majority of the
Supreme Court reversed. In the principal opinion no mention was
made of the clause having to do with utility trailers, and the court
predicated its decision upon the case of Waddey v. Maryland Casualty
Co.,5 wherein coverage was denied to one towing a boy's homemade
3. Sturdivant, Insurance, 6 VAxN. L. REv. 1068, 1071 (1953).
4. 276 S.W.2d 711 (Tern. 1954).
5. 171 Tenn. 112, 100 S.W.2d 984, 109 A.L.R. 654 (1937).
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wagon behind his automobile. The policy language was not identical
in the two cases, since in the Waddey case the policy excluded from lia-
bility the vehicle while "being used for towing or propelling any trailer
or any vehicle used as a trailer." The court in the Waddey case had
adopted the definition of "trailer" given in Webster's New International
Dictionary as "a vehicle or one in a succession of vehicles hauled, us-
ually, by some other vehicle." The Court of Appeals had undertaken
to distinguish the Waddey case on the difference in policy language,
specifically, the effect of the added phrase "or any vehicle used as a
trailer." The majority of the Supreme Court felt that this distinction
was not valid and, relying on the Waddey case, denied coverage. There
was a short but vigorous dissent by Chief Justice Neil wherein he
stated that it was conceded that the vehicle was not a trailer but was
an automobile, that he interpreted the majority opinion as recognizing
an ambiguity in the policy and that he was in agreement with the
Court of Appeals wherein they had recognized such an ambiguity and
resolved it against the insurance company. On petition to rehear, the
court declared that the majority did not consider the policy ambiguous
and that the Waddey case was controlling. To the argument that the
enumerated exclusions of home, office, store, display, or passenger
trailers operated to include all others, the court held that the listing
was not an attempt to enumerate all excluded trailers but was simply
an explanation and definition of utility trailers by saying what they
were not.6 Also in the petition to rehear, the argument was made that
the Tennessee Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act 7 operated
to effect coverage. The court noted that our act, unlike those of certain
other states, is not a compulsory insurance law, and does not provide
for absolute liability on the part of the companies; and accordingly,
the act does not affect the question of coverage in this case.8
There was one federal case from the eastern district involving the
question of coverage. 9 The plaintiff transportation company, a common
carrier, having certain miscellaneous freight to be hauled for which
its own facilities were not available, arranged for one Carter to make
the haul, compensation to be on a mileage basis. Carter hauled beer
for a distributing company, which was named with Carter as the in-
sured in the policy on Carter's truck. While on the trip, Carter's truck
and driver were involved in a collision with third parties who were
seriously injured. The third parties brought suit against Carter,
6. It is difficult to discern any pattern in this type of case involving non-
descript vehicles. See Note, 31 A.L.R.2d 298 (1953). Further policy definition
can probably be expected.
7. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 2715.49-15.68 (Williams Supp. 1952).
8. Compulsory insurance laws can affect coverage. United States Cas. Co.
v. Timmerman, 118 N.J. Eq. 563, 180 Atl. 629 (Ch. 1935).
9. Epstern T. & W.N.C. Transp. Co. v. Virginia Surety Co., 129 F. Supp. 305
(E.D. Tenn. 1953).
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Carter's driver, the transportation company, and the distributing com-
pany. The transportation company called upon Carter to compromise
and settle the suits and when he declined, negotiated settlements of
the suits for $17,000 and again called on Carter and his insurance
carrier to make settlement. On their failure to do so, the transportation
company through its insurance carrier, settled the cases and brought
suit and obtained judgment in the chancery court against Carter for the
amount of the settlement. 0 After a nulla bona return, the present
action was brought seeking a recovery of the amount of the settlement
from Carter's insurance carrier. Defense was made on several grounds,
one of which was that the policy did not cover the accident because
the truck was not at the time being used to haul beer. The policy had
described the occupation of the insured "truck owner and driver" and
had provided the purpose for which the automobile was to be used as
"hauling Beer (Distributor)." The policy further provided that it ap-
plied only to accidents occurring "while the automobile is within the
United States of America ... or is being transported between parts
thereof and is owned, maintained and used for the purposes stated as
applicable thereto in the declarations." As the first affirmative defense,
the insurance company argued that the vehicle was not being so used
at the time of the accident in that it was not hauling beer but miscel-
laneous merchandise. The use declared in the policy was a commercial
use, and such use was defined in the policy as "used principally in the
business occupation of the named insured as stated in item 1, including
occasional use for personal, pleasure, family and other business pur-
poses." The court held that all that is required by this policy is that the
declared use of the vehicle be the principal use, not the only use. This
holding was amply supported by decisions of the Tennessee courts and
those of other jurisdictions." Pertinent to the decision, though inci-
dental thereto, was the fact that the insured was being charged a
premium based upon the hauling of miscellaneous freight which was
approximately fifty per cent in excess of the premium that would be
applicable to hauling beer alone. Further, it was pointed out that by
endorsement the policy had specifically excluded coverage while
hauling gasoline and certain other inflammables which was deemed
inconsistent with the insistence of use restricted to the hauling of beer.
By another affirmative defense, the defendant relied upon the policy
exclusion, obtaining in the event that the named insured should rent,
10. Carter v. Eastern T. & W.N.C. Transp. Co., 35 Tenn. App. 196, 243 S.W.2d
505 (E.S. 1949). This case was strongly contested, it being urged that contri-
bution was being sought from a joint tort-feasor. The court held, however,
that the transportation company's liability was derivative and that the doc-
trine of Cohen v. Noel, 165 Tenn. 600, 56 S.W.2d 744 (1933), permitted in-
demnity.
11. See, e.g. Smith v. Service Fire Ins. Co., 184 Tenn. 139, 197 S.W.2d 233
(1946); Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Blankenship, 134 F.2d 784 (6th Cir.
1943); Constitution Indemnity Co. v. Lane, 67 F.2d 433 (6th Cir. 1933).
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hire or lease the vehicle to any other person, firm or corporation. When
the transportation company and Carter had made the agreement, they
had signed a document which was labeled "lease agreement" and which
purported to rent or lease the vehicle involved. The court found that
the agreement had obviously been misnamed, that the language had
not correctly described the agreement between the parties, that the
undisputed proof showed that by the arrangement Carter was to be
paid so much per mile for the distance traveled, and that their agree-
ment was not in any sense one of leasing.
The third affirmative defense was predicated upon the policy's
exclusion, obtaining in the event that the named insured should rent,
agreement. The so-called lease agreement also contained a provision
purporting to make Carter liable for all personal injury or property
damage occasioned by the vehicle. The court noted that plaintiff was a
legalized common carrier and could not relieve itself of liability oc-
casioned by its hauling; accordingly, the agreement with Carter in
this respect was void. The court adjudicated recovery in favor of the
plaintiff for the amount of the judgment and interest.
Another case involving the duty of a liability insurance company
under its policy was Munal Clinic v. Applegate,12 decided by the Court
of Appeals for the Eastern Section. The policy provision involved was
the usual requirement that "when bodily injury occurs written notice
shall be given by or on behalf of the insured to the company or any
of its authorized agents as soon as practicable." The Munal Clinic had
Applegate as a patient. On June 30, 1952, three days after his admis-
sion, he escaped. He was thereafter arrested and confined to jail on a
charge of public drunkenness, where he died from a heart attack on the
same day. The Munal Clinic made no report to the insurance company
until February 27, 1953, two days after the clinic had received notice
from attorneys for Applegate's administrator that they were claiming
liability of the clinic for Applegate's death. Suit was subsequently
filed on April 27, 1953, wherein it was alleged that the clinic negligently
failed to attend and confine Applegate while he was delirious and ir-
rational. The Munal Clinic filed this suit in the chancery court against
its insurer, and others, seeking a declaratory judgment as to whether
or not the insurance company was obligated to furnish a defense to
the law suit. The defense of the company was that the complainant
had violated the aforesaid notice provision of the policy. The company
in its pleadings alleged generally that it had been prejudiced by such
failure. The chancellor declared that the insurance company must ex-
tend coverage to the clinic and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The
court concurred in the chancellor's view that there was no reason-
able ground for complainant to believe that a claim against it for
12. 273 S.W.2d 712 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1954).
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damages would arise and that, until there is such reasonable ground,
the duty to give notice does not arise.13 Further the court stated that
there was no evidence that the delay had prejudiced the rights of
the defendant. Earlier Tennessee cases, however, had indicated that
an insurer need not show prejudice where notice was a condition
precedent to coverage.14
In Kuhn's, Inc. v. Bituminous Casualty Co.,'5 there was presented a
question of coverage under a limited coverage liability policy on two
store buildings. The policy was the usual property liability policy,
and its limitations were $10,000 for one accident and $25,000 as an ag-
gregate liability. Two of the exclusion clauses were significant in the
decision of the case. Clause (g) excluded "injury to or destruction of
buildings or contents thereof caused by the discharge, leakage or over-
flow of water or steam . . . ." Clause (h) provided for exclusion of
coverage with respect "(2) to the collapse of or structural injury to
any building or structure due (a) to excavation, tunneling ... while
such operations are being performed by the named insured." Kuhn's
was converting the two buildings into a single store building and had
done excavating under the buildings. The excavating work had been
completed prior to May 27, 1952. On this date the complainant's build-
ing, together with the building adjoining on the east, collapsed, and
the buildings and all the contents were a total loss. On May 29, 1952,
the building adjoining on the west collapsed, and it and its contents
were a total loss. Claims were presented against Kuhn's, one in the
amount of $14,800 for the personal property destroyed on May 27, 1952,
in the building to the east and another in the amount of $28,900 for
personal property destroyed by the collapse on May 29, 1952, of the
building to the west. The insurance company denied liability for these
items, and suit was brought for collection, it being agreed that Kuhn's
was obligated therefor to the respective owners. The chancellor and
the Supreme Court noted that exclusion clause (g) makes reference
specifically to the contents of other buildings but that no such specific
reference to contents is made in exclusion clause (h), that the wording
of clause (h) makes it doubtful whether building contents were in the
minds of the parties in connection with the exclusion, and that, at the
minimum, the clause is ambiguous. Accordingly, the insurance com-
pany was held liable. Secondarily, there was involved the question as
to whether there was only one accident so that the $10,000 limitation
measured the extent of the company's liability. The court concluded
13. It is settled that circumstances may excuse delay, Massachusetts Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. England, 171 Tenn. 104, 100 S.W.2d 982 (1937); and that a
reasonable belief that no claim will be made from a trivial occurence is such
a circumstance. Note, 18 A.L.R.2d 443, 474 (1951).
14. Phoenix Cotton Oil Co. v. Royal Indemnity Co., 140 Tenn. 438, 205 S.W.
128 (1918); Foreman v. Union Indemnity Co., 12 Tenn.' App. 89 (E.S. 1928).
15. 270 S.W.2d 358 (Tenn. 1954).
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that the fact that one loss happened two days after the other one made
it clear that there were two accidents, and the company was held liable
within its aggregate policy limits.
Another case involving a matter of coverage was Butler v. United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.16 In this case the defendant was suc-
cessful. Butler was in the construction business and carried a "Manu-
facturers or Contractors Schedule Liability Policy," covering several
hazards. Among the hazards covered was liability for personal injury
on account of "carpentry in the construction of detached private resi-
dences." Butler made certain repairs and improvements to a residence
in Memphis, and in addition to the contract of repair, he agreed to
keep and maintain said repairs in proper condition for a period of one
year. Butler finished the work and sometime thereafter an occupant
of the premises fell when a bannister that had been repaired by Butler
gave way. Butler was forced to employ counsel and successfully de-
fend the suit for personal injury. The present suit was filed against the
insurance carrier seeking to recover the expenditure that was made
on account of attorney's fees. A demurrer was filed to the complain-
ant's bill and was sustained by the chancellor. The Supreme Court
affirmed. The court distinguished the situation where the accident
occurs during an interim in the work and held that the work here
having been completed, the insurer was no longer liable under this
carpentry hazard even though the repairs were negligently made and
notwithstanding that insured had contracted to keep same in repair
for a period of one year.
17
II. FIRE INSURANcE
A case of first impression in Tennessee was decided during the survey
period by the Eastern Section of the Court of Appeals. 18 Although no
petition for certiorari was filed in the case, the opinion has been pub-
lished. The First Christian Church of Greeneville had insured its
building with a standard fire insurance policy covering "all direct
loss by fire" to the church building. On the occasion of the loss the
heat generated by the furnace was too great for the water in the boiler
with the result that the water evaporated and the boiler melted. The
heat melted or burned off about five inches of two control wires, the
wooden wall at the rear of the furnace was blackened, and the paint
was burned off the top part of the steel jacket covering the boiler. The
fire did not escape from the fire box. The claim made was for damage
to the furnace, it not even being claimed that the blackened wood had
16. 277 S.W.2d 348 (Tenn. 1955).
17. The holding is not surprising in view of dictum in Foster Trailer Co.
v. United States F. & G. Co., 190 Tenn. 181, 187, 228 S.W.2d 107. 110 (1950).
18. First Christian Church v. Hartford Mut. Ins. Co., 276 S.W.2d 502 (Tenn.
App. E.S. 1954).
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been charred. The fire insurance companies denied liability, and suit
was brought in the circuit court where the plaintiff had judgment. The
Court of Appeals, in an exhaustive opinion by Judge Hale, re-
versed and dismissed the action. The text authorities and courts in
other jurisdictions have long made a distinction between "friendly"
as distinguished from "hostile" fires,19 but the question had not here-
tofore been decided in a reported case in Tennessee. Recognizing the
authority to the contrary,20 the court adopted the clear majority rule,
which makes a distinction between the two types of fires and inter-
prets the quoted section of a standard fire policy as covering only the
"hostile" type. The distinction is that if the fire burns in a place where
it is intended to burn, although with unintended results, the fire is a
friendly fire; on the other hand, if the fire is not confined to the place
intended or is unintentionally started, it is deemed hostile. Of course,
where a friendly fire escapes, it becomes hostile. The facts in this case
put this fire into the friendly category.
III. TBEFT INSURANCE
The case of Commercial Credit Corp. v. Monroe2' decided by the
Middle Section of the Court of Appeals, involved a question of coverage
under an automobile theft policy and the measure of damages for loss
under such a policy. The policy stated that the purposes for which
the automobile would be used were "business and pleasure." The
policy provided that there was no coverage while the automobile is
used "as a public or livery conveyance" unless such use had been
specifically declared and a premium paid therefor which was not the
situation in this case. Monroe was in the entertainment business and
used the automobile to transport himself and his employees about the
country to give performances. The court affirmed the chancellor in
his finding that this use did not amount to a "public or livery con-
veyance" use of the automobile and, accordingly, was not within the
exclusion of the policy. The court recognized the distinction between
such a use and the use of an automobile as a taxicab which has been
held to make this exclusion clause applicable.22 As to the question of
the measure of damages, the policy contained the usual provisions
as follows: "the limit of the company's liability for loss shall not exceed
the actual cash value of the automobile, or if the loss is of a part thereof
the actual cash value of such part, at time of loss nor what it would
then cost to repair or replace the automobile or such part thereof
19. See 5 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 3082 (1941); 29 Am. JUR.,
Insurance § 1016 (1940).
20. Salmon v. Concordia Fire Ins. Co., 161 So. 340 (La. App. 1935).
21. 277 S.W.2d 423 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1954).
22. Smith v. Service Fire Ins. Co., 184 Tenn. 139, 197 S.W.2d 233 (1946);
Jackson v. Old Colony Ins. Co., 31 Tenn. App. 424, 216 S.W.2d 354 (M.S. 1948).
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with other of like kind and quality, with deduction for depreciation,
nor the applicable limit of liability stated in the declarations." 23
The proof showed that the value of the automobile when stolen
was $2,195, and the value of the salvage when recovered was less than
$600. The wrecked car's value after some repairs was $625. There was
proof that it would cost about $1,000 to repair the car and that even
after it was repaired, it would not be in as good condition as before
the theft. The chancellor so found and the Court of Appeals concurred
in the finding. Upon such facts, the court deemed the legal question
already decided by the Supreme Court 24 in its holding that the reason-
able meaning of such policy provisions is that the duty of the insurer
is to put the insured in the same situation with regard to his automobile
as he was before the loss and that if this cannot be done by the re-
placement and repair provisions of the policy, it must be done by
paying the cost of the automobile less the fair value of the salvage.
Obviously, this presents a question of fact in most cases. The court
affirmed the recovery awarded by the chancellor, the value of the
automobile when stolen less the value of the salvage.
A federal case involving a unique situation was Clark & Jones, Inc.
v. American Mutual Liability Ins. Co. 25 The plaintiff owned and oper-
ated a music store and was covered by theft insurance, which re-
quired that the "insured shall keep verifiable records of all property
covered by the policy." During the years in question, 1946-1951, the
plaintiff kept records, including inventory records, on the musical
instruments, radios, and other large items of merchandise. As to sheet
music and music books, no records were kept other than an "annual
inventory" amounting to a foot and inch measurement of the height of
the piles. Neither the records on the larger items of merchandise, nor
this inventory taking as to sheet music disclosed any losses by the
plaintiff. However, in November of 1951 one Godwin, who had been an
employee of plaintiff during the years in question, made a confes-
sion that during the five years in question he had taken from plaintiff's
funds and appropriated to his own use approximately $6.50 per day.
Shortly thereafter Godwin died. It was admitted that plaintiff had
no evidence of loss other than the aforesaid confession, the competency
of which had been objected to by the defendant. The court noted that
in Tennessee the "iron safe clause" of fire insurance policies is en-
forced,26 although substantial rather than absolute accuracy in com-
23. The policy also provided: "The company may pay for the loss in money
or may repair or replace the automobile or such part thereof, as aforesaid, or
may return any stolen property with payment for any resultant damage thereto
at any time before the loss is paid or the property is so replaced, or may take
all or such part of the automobile at the agreed or appraised value but there
shall be no abandonment to the company."
24. Weems v. Service Fire Ins. Co., 181 Tenn. 1, 178 S.W.2d 377 (1944).
25. 129 F. Supp. 282 (E.D. Tenn. 1955).
26. Kustoff v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co., 160 Tenn. 208, 22 S.W.2d 356 (1929).
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pliance is required.27 A like rule as to record keeping is recognized.28
The court did not actually sustain the objection to the competency of
the confession but noted the rule in criminal cases that a confession
loses its weight unless the corpus delecti is otherwise established.
29
The proof in this case not only failed to confirm the corpus delecti but
rather contradicted it. The court concluded that the aforesaid require-
ment of the policy had not been met by the insured as to a substantial
segment of its business, that the clear implication is that had it been
followed, this shortage, if it actually existed, would have been dis-
covered, and that as a result the insurer had been prejudiced by the
lack of compliance. The plaintiff's case was accordingly dismissed.
Turning more on a question of contract law than of insurance was
Continental Ins. Co. v. Weinstein,30 decided by the Middle Section of
the Court of Appeals. Certain diamonds were shipped from New York
on consignment to the defendant in Nashville. The complainant insur-
ance company insured the diamonds against loss on a policy issued
to the consignor. The defendant received the shipment and after a
period of time retained some of the diamonds but returned the others.
The diamonds returned were delivered by the defendant to the express
agency and a nominal value declared thereon pursuant to previous
instructions of the consignor. They were stolen or lost en route. The
consignor made a demand upon the defendant for the full value of the
original shipment but made no mention of insurance. At the same time
the complainant insurance company paid the loss to the consignor but
no notice of this fact was given to the defendant. Subsequently and
pursuant to the claim of the consignor, the defendant remitted its
check for the price of the diamonds that it had retained; the check
bore the notation "in full settlement of all claims" and was cleared by
the consignor. In this suit the insurer, as subrogee of the consignor,
sought recovery from Weinstein, the consignee, apparently on a
theory of negligence in having declared a nominal value on the return
shipment. The chancellor dismissed the bill and the Court of Appeals
affirmed. The court found that the acceptance by the consignor of the
defendant's check, reciting that it was in full settlement of all claims,
amounted to a compromise settlement of the claim of consignor. The
court applied the rules of law, settled in Tennessee and elsewhere,
that the insurer is subrogated only to such rights as the insured pos-
sessed,31 and that the right of the insurer against the wrongdoer may be
27. Accident and Cas. Ins. Co. v. Lasater, 32 Tenn. App. 161, 222 S.W.2d
202 (E.S. 1949).
28. Ibid.
29. Ashby v. State, 124 Tenn. 684, 139 S.W. 872 (1911); Williams v. State,
80 Tenn. 211 (1883).
30. 37 Tenn. App. 596, 267 S.W.2d 521 (M.S. 1953).




defeated by the action of the insured prior to the loss, or even after the
loss, unless the wrongdoer has knowledge of the insurer's right of
subrogation.32 There was no such knowledge in this case at the time
of the settlement; moreover, the nominal valuation was declared by
defendant pursuant to direction of the consignor.
IV. HEALTH, ACCIDENT AND DISABILITY INSURAN CE
In the field of health and accident insurance there were three cases
involving the meaning of language in the policies. In Ferguson v.
Postal Life & Casualty Ins. Co.,33 decided by the Eastern Section of
the Court of Appeals, the intestate had a limited accident insurance
policy with the defendant. The policy provided for a $500 death benefit
if accidental death was caused "by the burning of a church, school
building, store, theatre, municipal administration building, office build-
ing, or library, while the insured is therein .... " The insured met his
death from fire or suffocation in the residence of his son-in-law. He was
in a sunroom which was used as a combination living room, library and
music room. In the room were book shelves and a bookcase, con-
taining an encyclopedia and other books including some related to his
son-in-law's work. The room was also equipped with a radio and
victrola. The suit was brought on the theory that the deceased was in
a "library" within the meaning of the policy. The chancellor dismissed
the suit and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The court rejected the
complainant's insistence that the policy provision was ambiguous and,
while finding no Tennessee cases on the point, applied the test of
"dominant use" as distinguished from "incidental use," recognized
by other jurisdictions.M It appeared merely that the insured had lost
his life in a private dwelling and that the use of this room as a library
was merely incidental to the occupants of the building.
In Interstate Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Gann,35 decided by the Supreme
Court, the company had issued an accident policy which provided for
payment of $500 for the loss of both arms or limbs or the sight of both
eyes. It also provided for the payment of one-half of said sum "for
the lost of one arm or limb or the sight of one eye." The plaintiff
had lost one leg and the sight of one eye and claimed the full sum.
The Supreme Court, affirming the trial court, held for the plaintiff.
It was noted that in our cases,36 as well as in English usage, "or" is
32. 29 Am. JuR., Insurance § 1344 (1940). Of course, the insured's release
before payment by the insurer may abrogate coverage, and his release after
payment may render him liable to the insurer. Notes, 36 A.L.R. 1267 (1925),
55 A.L.R. 926 (1928), 38 A.L.R.2d 1095 (1954).
33. 37 Tenn. App. 615, 267 S.W.2d 760 (E.S. 1954).
34. Spiller -V. Washington Nat. Ins. Co., 240 Mo. App. 226, 206 S.W.2d 581
(1947); Dunn v. National Cas. Co., 255 App. Div. 52, 5 N.Y.S.2d 699 (2d Dep't
1938).
35. 19*6 Tenn. 422, 268 S.W.2d 336 (1954).
36. Smith v. Haire, 133 Tenn. 343, 181 S.W. 161 (1915) (bank deposit);
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often recognized to mean "and." The policy clearly agreed to pay
$250 for the loss of the leg and to pay $250 for the loss of an eye, and
there was no expressive language confining liability to only one pay-
ment. The contract, being ambiguous, was construed against the
company.
Another case involving the meaning of language in an accident policy
was Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Walt,37 decided by the Supreme
Court. The policy provided for double indemnity if the insured died
"in consequence of the burning of a building, provided the insured is
therein or thereon at the commencement of the fire . . . ." The proof
showed that the insured died from burns received when the mattress
on his bed became ignited. While the mattress emitted smoke, it did
not flame up until the firemen threw it out the window. The only
damage to the room itself was a scorched or burned place on the
floor, and there was no proof that this had anything to do with the
extensive burns about the body of the insured. The administrator of
the insured brought suit for the double indemnity payment provided in
the policy and had a recovery in the trial court which was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and
reversed, holding that there was no ambiguity in the policy provision
and that the facts demonstrated that there was no burning of the build-
ing other than the small charred areas and no evidence from which
even an inference could be deemed that this could have accounted for
the injury to the deceased.
38
Though not finally settling the rights between the parties, of interest
is the case of Alsup v. Travelers Ins. Co.,39 decided by the Supreme
Court. The suit was one filed in the chancery court to recover dis-
ability benefits under a group policy. To the bill the defendant filed
a special plea in bar raising the six year statute of limitations. The
parties entered into a stipulation of fact to the effect that the com-
plainant had been employed by the Carnation Company, that his
employment terminated on November 4, 1944, and that as to com-
plainant the insurance involved was cancelled on November 30, 1944.
Suit had not been brought until September 25, 1951; and the initial
action being dismissed on a plea in abatement, the present suit was
instituted on April 11, 1952. The policy provided for payment by the
insurer in the event of total disability. By the policy the employer
Bird v. State, 131 Tenn. 518, 175 S.W. 554 (1915) (statute); Ransom v. Ruther-
ford County, 123 Tenn. 1, 130 S.W. 1057 (1910) (statute).
37. 277 S.W.2d 434 (Tenn. 1955).
38. In accord that the burning of the contents of a building is generally
deemed insufficient to meet the requirements of such a policy, see 29 AM. JUR.,
Insurance § 1013 (1940); Notes, 125 A.L.R. 1440 (1940), 33 A.L.R. 64 (1924).
And the authorities are agreed that if a building is only partially burned, such
burning must be the proximate cause of the injuries before coverage applies.
Ibid.
39. 196 Tenn. 346, 268 S.W.2d 90 (1954).
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was given the right to elect the mode of settlement. While it does
not appear from the opinion, counsel in the case advise that the em-
ployer may elect payment in a lump sum, monthly payments extending
over one year, or monthly or annual payments extending over two,
three, four, five, ten, fifteen or twenty years. The bill alleged that
complainant was totally disabled. The chancellor sustained the special
statute of limitations plea and dismissed the suit. The Supreme Court,
in its initial opinion affirmed the chancellor upon the ground that no
proof of loss was shown to have been given within a reasonable time.
A petition to rehear was filed pointing out that the original bill con-
tained an allegation that proof of disability had been furnished under
the terms of the policy and that such allegation, not having been denied
by the defendant's special plea, was deemed admitted. The court
recognized the validity of this insistence4 and granted the petition to
rehear. Thereupon, the matter of the statute of limitations was con-
sidered, and the court noted that insofar as disability benefits are
payable in installments, Tennessee has held that each installment
constitutes a distinct cause of action, successively suable.41 Accord-
ingly, the employer not having elected any particular mode of set-
tlement and there being no time limit specified in the policy as to
when employers must do so, it cannot be said that the six-year statute
of limitations is a bar to complainant's suit. The court recognized
that some installments might be barred and others not barred. The
chancellor was reversed and the cause remanded for "answer or such
other action as is deemed advisable, in conformity with this opinion."
42
V. LIFE INsURANcE
In the life insurance field there was decided the case of Kentucky
Home Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Rogers.43 The case is one of two arising
out of a rather unique situation in the field of group insurance. Some
years ago the Inter-Southern Life Insurance Company had issued a
group policy to the Nashville Postal Employees Benefit Society. While
40. GIBsoN, SUITS IN CHANCERY §§ 321, 342 (4th ed., Higgins & Crownover
1937).
41. Atkinson v. Railroad Employes' Mut. Relief Soc'y, 160 Tenn. 158, 22
S.W.2d 631 (1929).
42. Alsup v. Travelers Ins. Co., 196 Tenn. 346, 356, 268 S.W.2d 90, 94 (1954).
We are advised by counsel that the case is still pending. The question im-
mediately presents itself as to what, if any, limitations there are upon the
employer's right of election as to mode of settlement. Since the case remains
pending it would not be proper herein to speculate as to the answer, but one
wonders whether the employer is bound to elect payment over a twenty-year
period which might be the most favorable to the complainant, or might he
elect the lump sum option, or payment under a one-year period whereby
presumably all payments would be barred by the statute, or is it possible
that the statutes will be deemed to commence running with the date of
his election although certainly this last possibility is not indicated by the
opinion hereinabove discussed.
43. 196 Tenn. 641, 270 S.W.2d 188 (1954).
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the policy set out the amount of insurance available to members ac-
cording to age and a schedule of premium rates according to age, the
policy was endorsed to provide that until otherwise provided by the
society, each member. should pay the same rate of insurance regardless
of age. The policy also provided: "At the end of each year from date
hereof the company shall have the right to change the premium rates
at which subsequent renewals shall be computed, such changes being
based on the Company's classified group mortality experience and
schedules then in force." For several years each member paid the
same premium for each $1,000 of insurance. In 1932 the Inter-Southern
went into receivership, and the Kentucky Mutual Life Insurance Com-
pany reinsured this business. Considering the unfairness of a premium
charge calculated without regard to age, the company with the con-
sent of the society in 1946 commenced calculating premiums according
to a step-rate schedule, that is, setting up several age groups. This
schedule did not eliminate the inequities of the other plan although
it moderated them. Subsequently, the company, without the consent
of the society, abandoned the step-rate plan and put into effect the
regular attained age plan where each person's premium depended
upon his age. With Rogers, who was advanced in years, the premium
was very substantially increased. Rogers declined to pay the ad-
vanced premium, and after the expiration of the grace period pro-
vided in the policy, the company lapsed his policy. At about the same
time one Duling, another postal employee, had filed suit against the
company in the circuit court but the suit had been removed to the
federal court. Duling's situation differed from Rogers' in that Duling
had continued to pay his premium in the increased amount, and he
sued for a return of all premiums paid. The district court had per-
mitted Duling's suit to lie as a class action and had granted to him
and the class a recovery of the excess premium paid. The district
court had found that the change to the step-rate basis was authorized,
and the excess of the attained age rate over the step-rate was the
basis of the recovery. The federal court of appeals reversed the district
court as to its holding Duling's suit to be a class action but affirmed
the recovery as to excess premiums with interest.4" Following the
above decision, the company wrote to Rogers offering to reinstate his
policy on the step-rate basis. This offer was declined, and this suit
was brought to recover all of the premiums paid by him together with
interest. Rogers was successful in the circuit court and in the Court of
Appeals. The Supreme Court granted certiorari but affirmed the lower
court. The court noted that where an insurer wrongfully cancels,
repudiates, or terminates a contract of insurance, the insured may
pursue either of three courses: (1) he may elect to consider the policy
44. Kentucky Home Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Duling, 190 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1951).
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at an end and recover its just value, or such measure of damages as
a court in the particular jurisdiction approves; (2) he may institute
proceedings to have the policy adjudged to be in force; or (3) he may
tender the premiums, and, if acceptance is refused, wait until the
policy by its terms becomes payable, and test the forfeiture in a
proper action on the policy.
45
Rogers, of course, had elected to pursue his rights under "(1)" above.
The court reached the same result as had the federal courts to the
effect that the change to the step-rate basis was valid and effective
but that the further attempted change without the consent of the
society was wrongful; that while the policy reserved to the company
the right annually to change premium rates, there was no reservation
of right to change the plan. Having so found, the question presented
was one of proper measure of damage. The court discussed the ques-
tion as to whether or not the action of the company amounted to a
constructive fraud but concluded that an answer to this question was
not essential to the decision. There had been an entire breach of con-
tract by the company,45 and Tennessee had already adopted the rule
that on such a breach an insured is not limited to a recovery of the
value of his policy but may recover all of the premiums paid to-
gether with interest.47
45. 6 COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INsURANcE LAW § 1429 (1930); see Notes, 48
A.L.R. 107 (1927), 107 A.L.R. 1233 (1937).
46. This situation is to be distinguished from that of an insurer's failure
to pay installments of a disability policy which only gives rise to successive
severable causes of action and does not ordinarily amount to an anticipatory
breach of the entire contract. See King v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 114 F. Supp. 700
(E.D. Tenn. 1953); Sturdivant, Insurance-1954 Tennessee Survey, 7 VAND. L.
REV. 851, 857 (1954); Atkinson v. Railroad Employes' Mut. Relief Soc'y, 160
Tenn. 158, 22 S.W.2d 631 (1929).
47. National Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Hamilton, 170 Tenn. 612, 98 S.W.2d 107
(1936); Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Baber, 168 Tenn. 347, 79 S.W.2d 36, 107 A.L.R.
1228 (1935). This measure is not universally accepted. Some courts hold that
if the insured is still insurable his measure of damages is the difference be-
tween the cost of carrying the insurance which he has for the stipulated term,
and the cost of new insurance for a like term; if he is no longer insurable, the
measure that has been applied is the present value of his policy as of date
of death less the estimated cost of carrying same from the date of cancella-
tion at his then age. Note, 107 A.L.R. 1233 (1937).
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